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THE EFFECT OF TRADE INDUCED DISPLACEMENT




This study provides an investigation into the differences in the postdisplacement la-
bor market experiences of workers separated from declining traded, expanding traded and
nontraded industries. The results presented provide the beginnings of a bridge across the
gap between what is known and what is perceived regarding the allocative efficiency effects
of trade-related labor displacements. The strategy of the paper is to relate the postdis-
placement experience of individuals to changes in the competitive position of the industry
from which the individual was displaced. The investigative lens is primarily focused on the
impact of changing industry competitiveness on the duration of unemployment spells and
the change in wages accompanying displacement.
The findings are that workers from traded industries in general suffer greater hard-
ship after displacement than do nontraded workers. They incur both a longer spell of unem-
ployment and a. greater loss of earnings. Within traded industries, workers separated from
declining traded industries fare much worse than those from expanding traded industries.
This evidence regarding the duration of the unemployment spell is then combined
with previous results regarding trade related displacements to provide an accounting of the
change in the aggregate number of weeks of unemployment resulting from changing trade
patterns. The finding is that although expansion of traded industries was sufficient to offset
the displacement effects of contracting traded industries, the longer spell of unemployment
by those from contracting industries results in a significant increase unemployed resources.
THE EFFECT OF TRADE INDUCED DISPLACEMENT




The decade of the 1980s was fraught with charges that international trade was steal-
ing jobs from the U.S. economy. Indeed, the AFL-CIO asserts that:
"Millions of well-paying and high-quality job opportunities
in the middle tier of the nation's income structure have been
sacrificed as a result of America's trade decline." 1
Haveman (1992) provides an extensive analysis of the change in the volume of displaced
workers arising from changes in trade patterns. While displacements are not synonymous
with jobs or employment, they do provide a reasonable indicator of the forces exerted by
trade on jobs and employment. The analysis presented there finds that the adjustment to
the changes in comparative advantage that took place during the 1980s served to reduce the
overall number of individuals displaced during the 1980s. This result suggests that perhaps
employment in-the United States was not affected to the extent that rhetoric would have us
believe.
Despite this evidence, few would suggest that the pattern of employment in the
United States has not been altered by changes in the global trading system. As is clear
from Appendix A, jobs were lost in the early 1980s and jobs were created in the latter part
of the 1980s.2 Although the analysis suggests insignificant changes in overall employment,
the distribution of employment, both intertemporally and across industries, has clearly been
altered by changing trade patterns.
1 The Pocketbook Issues: AFL-CIO Policy Recommendations for 1992, pg. 16.
2 This is consistent with the findings of Singleton (1990).
1
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This paper attempts to determine whether the cost of jobs lost is greater than the
benefits associated with job gains. These costs and benefits are measured in terms of weeks
of unemployment and changes in wages for displaced individuals. The analysis builds on the
assumption that an industry or time period that benefits from changing trade patterns expe-
riences fewer displacements and, conversely, declining industries and time periods experience
a larger number of displacements. The question is, if changing trade patterns result in no,
or almost no, change in the number of displacements, but instead result in a transfer of dis-
placements from one industry to another, what implications does this have for the aggregate
number of weeks of unemployment? I.e., does this particular reshuffiing of displacements
from expanding to declining traded industries result in significantly longer or shorter spells
of unemployment? Does it result in larger or smaller changes in observed wages?
The analysis presented below makes use of the results found in Haveman (1992)
to identify individuals who are likely to have been displaced by changes in the pattern of
international trade.3 The sample of observations on displaced workers is divided into three
subsamples: those from declining traded industries, those from expanding traded industries,
and those from nontraded industries. This categorization is based on the particular year
and industry of displacement. The subsequent analysis focuses on the extent to which the
postdisplacement labor market experiences of individuals differ across these three categories.
A subsequent ~counting of the change in the aggregate number of weeks of UIiemployment
resulting from changing trade patterns is performed.
The investigation of the differences in postdisplacement experiences will be decom-
posed into two sources. The first source is the extent to which workers displaced from
different industries are characterized by observable traits that would lead to longer spells of
unemployment or that are more likely to result in larger wage changes. The second source is
the extent to which the type of industry, controlling for observable individual-specific char-
acteristics, matters for the postdisplacement experience. The extent to which workers with
3 Reproduced for reference in Appendix A.
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identical demographic characteristics face a greater struggle when displaced from declining
traded industries will be taken as evidence of a greater need for assistance to trade displaced
workers. The presence of such differences is put forth as justification for a program, such as
the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, which provides additional unemployment
benefits to workers whose displacement is determined to be trade-related.
In order to justify a call for special adjustment assistance to workers displaced by
trade, one needs to show that these workers suffer undue hardship.4 Previous studies have
found evidence that workers displaced by trade do tend to exhibit greater difficulty than other
displaced workers. This result is, however, generally based on the observation that trade
displaced workers possess characteristics that increase the difficulty of obtaining subsequent
employment. This in itself is insufficient reason for trade-related assistance and suggests
merely assistance related to an individuals characteristics. This study searches specifically
for some intrinsic unobservable element associated with trade displacement that results in
greater hardship. It is the existence of such an element that justifies specific assistance,
beyond standard unemployment insurance benefits, to trade-displaced workers.
In what follows, the post-displacement labor market experience is to be represented
by the change in wages and the duration of the spell of unemployment. The next section
contains a brief theoretical discussion of why it is to be expected that trade displaced workers
might endure a: greater degree of postdisplacement difficulty. The following section provides
a brief summary of previous work regarding trade and worker dislocation. Section 4 will
provide a brief description of the data used, Section 5 presents descriptive statistics calculated
from the observations used in the subsequent analysis. Section 6 will discuss in some detail
the econometric methodology and the sample of observations used in the analysis presented
in Section 7. Section 8 presents a decomposition of the unemployment spells suffered by
workers from each of the three categories discussed above. Section 9 contains some general
conclusions and a discussion of implications for policy issues arising from the results.
4 Additional reasons may be to facilitate the acceptance of reduced protection for a particular industry.
2. Theory and Expectations
The a priori expectations are that individuals displaced from declining traded indus-
tries will have a more difficult postdisplacement labor market experience than those displaced
from other industries. In addition, it is expected that those displaced from expanding traded
industries would fare better than all others. As discussed above, more/less difficult will be
gauged in two ways; first, through differences in the duration of unemployment spells accord-
ing to the type of industry from which the individual was displaced,. and second, through
the wages received in the postdisplacement job relative to wages in the predisplacement
job. Trade displaced workers are expected, ceteris paribus, to experience longer spells of
unemployment and a larger decline in wages, than other displaced workers.
These expectations are largely a result of human capital arguments. An individual
who has been working in a particular industry will have received training biased more towards
industry/occupation-specific skills rather than more general types of training. An individ-
ual who experiences displacement suffers an immediate erosion of the iildustry/occupation-
specific portion of their human capital, leading to a decline in future wages. Despite this
erosion, the labor market will continue to view this individual as being best suited for
particular types of activities, activities comparable to those performed in the industry of
displacement.
It is hypothesized that a certain amount of substitutability exists in industry-specific
human capital. This substitutability will serve to reduce the erosion of human capital result-
ing from displacement. For example, an individual displaced from the auto industry may,
because of skills developed there, be more suited to working for Caterpillar, than will an
observationally equivalent individual displaced from a service oriented industry.
It is this substitutability that suggests that trade displaced workers will experience
longer spells of unemployment and larger reductions in wages than will other individuals. The
driving force behind this is a concept as fundamental as the chain of comparative advantage.5




The connection with the chain of comparative advantage is as follows. For simplicity's sake,
assume there is a continuum of goods and that there are only two inputs to production,
skilled and unskilled labor. Further assume that the goods can be ranked according to the
skill intensity of the production process. Figure 1 is a representation of such a rank-ordering,
where the production of good A uses unskilled workers relatively more intensively than an
industry such as B. If we further assume that the United States is among the countries
endowed with a highly skilled labor force, comparative advantage suggests that the United
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In the event that there is a change in the skill composition of the labor force in
countries outside of the United States, this could imply a change in USL, to USL1. Note
that such a change could also result from the international flow of technology or reduced
transport costs. The United States now produces traded goods in the range [USLll USu].
The human capital substitutability hypothesis implies that individuals displaced from indus-
try A will be the most useful (command the highest wages) should they become reemployed
in some industry in the range [A - t:, A + t:], i.e., in an industry "close to" A in the chain
of comparative advantage. The above change in endowments suggests that industries in
the range [USLl' USu] will expand, while industries in the range [USL, USL1] will contract.
The differential effects for workers displaced from contracting industries, relative to those
· ",-_ 6
displaced from expanding industries,6 arise from the fact that industries "close to" a declin-
ing industry are also likely to be declining, while industries "close to" expanding industries
are also likely to be expanding. Hence; the reemployment possibilities for workers displaced
from declining traded industries are somewhat dimmer than for those from expanding traded
industries.
In addition to the industries discussed above, the analysis will take into account
workers displaced from nontraded industries. There is no a priori reasoning that suggests
nontraded industries will expand or contract with changes in the space U.S. manufacturing
takes on the traded goods continuum. It is, therefore, conjectured that the postdisplacement
experience of those from nontraded industries will be intermediate between those displaced
from declining traded industries and those from expanding traded industries.
3. Previous Research
There is a vast literature investigating the employment effects of changes in interna-
tional competition.7 A small fraction of this literature goes one step further attempting to
characterize the winner and loser of changing competition. An even smaller literature exists
that looks specifically at samples of displaced workers.
Only one study, to my knowledge, has made use of the Displaced Worker Survey
(DWS) in the context of changing trade patterns.8 ,9 Kruse (1988) provides a detailed analysisI
of the effects of trade displacement on unemployment duration. His results confirm the
existence of a relationship between long term import change, from the early 1970s through the
1980s, in a manufacturing industry and the duration of joblessness for workers displaced from
that industry. The primary result is that a one percent increase in the import penetration
6 As discu.ssed in Haveman(1992), displacements can occur in expanding industries via the exit of inefficient firms,and through the imperlect process of replacing voluntary attritions.
7 See Tyson et al. (1988, Ch. 2) for a survey of these studies.
8 See Tyson et al. (1988, pg. 61), for a discussion of data on trade related displacements originating within theTAA program and studies that make use of these data.
9 Other studies have used this dataset to look at the returns to seniority (Kletzer 1989), the effects of plantclosing notification on the duration of unemployment (Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988 and 1989), and the generalwage and tmemployment consequences of displacement (Addison and Portugal 1987 and Podgursky and Swaim1987a).
7 .....-
ratio results in a 1.25 week increase in the median duration of unemployment for workers
displaced from that industry.
This result, however, disappears when individual-specific heterogeneity is accounted
for in the specification of the model. With a more comprehensive specification, a one percent
increase in the import penetration ratio is found to increase median joblessness by a statis-
tically insignificant .4 weeks. This result is consistent with previous studies that conclude
that workers displaced from high-import-change industries have demographic characteristics
that increase the difficulty of the postdispla.cement experience.
There are several aspects of Kruse's study that are questionable. First, there is no
direct link between changes in international competition and the sample of workers identified
as displaced from high-import-change industries. The author does find a high correlation
between high-import-change industries and long term reductions in employment. While the
decline in employment is very possibly due to increased competition, the causation could
also run the other direction. IT the domestic market is for some reason not being adequately
served by domestic producers, price will rise attracting the attention of foreign suppliers,
leading to an increase in the import penetration ratio.
Second, there is no direct link between changes in international competition and the
specific dataset employed. Given the long time span over which import change is calculated,
it is quite pos~ible that the adjustment to changes in competition occurred in the mid-
to-late 1970s. In this case, the trade displacement would have occurred prior to the start
of the 1984 DWS and the sample used would not accurately reflect the characteristics or
postdisplacement experience of those displaced because of trade.
4. Data
The data used in this study are from the 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990 Displaced
Workers Surveys (DWS). These surveys were conducted as supplements to the January
Current Population Surveys (CPS) of same years. These supplements are designed to provide
data pertaining to the effects of involuntary job loss. It asks respondents aged greater than
19 if they lost a job within the last five years to which they have not returned. It then
proceeds to collect demographic information regarding the previous job, wages, receipt of
health insurance, full or part time status, and most importantly, the reason for displacement;
reasons including plant closing, slack work, the abolition of a position, failure of a self-owned
business, the end of a seasonal job, or "other reasons" .10
For the purposes of this study, workers displaced from full time positions that were
at least 18 years old and are currently less than 65 years old will be included. The scope of
displacements is further confined to those displaced because of a plant shutdown, slack work,
or the abolition of a position.11 Not only does this restriction on the source of displacements
reduce problems of data contamination,12 but this sample probably most closely reflects the
group of displaced workers influenced by changes in trade patterns.
The data used to classify individuals as displaced from expanding or declining in-
dustries are presented in Appendix A. These data indicate whether there was an increase
or decrease in displacements for each industry in each year due to changes in international
competition. For each observation in the DWS, the individual specifies an industry from
which and a year in which they were displaced. If the year/industry combination was found
to exhibit a larger number of displacements than it would have in the absence of changing
trade patterns,. that individual is classified as displaced from a declining traded industry.I
Conversely, if displacements were lower, the individual is classified as displaced from an
expanding traded industry. The remaining observations are classified as displaced from a
nontraded industry.
10 Please see WHOOOOO???????
11 This excludes workers displaced because of the end of a seasonal job, the failme of a self-owned business, or"other reasons" .
12 I.e., , through the inclusion of workers that returned to their previous employer and hence were not trulydisplaced.
5. Descriptive Statistics
This section provides a brief description of the displaced workers and how they differ
across the three categories of industries. Separate tables are presented for three populations
of displaced workers: (1) all observations of displaced workers in the 1980s, (2) those ob-
servations used in the unemployment regressions, and (3) the observations of reemployed
workers used in the post displacement wage equation. A more complete unweighted set of
statistics reflecting all of the data used in the econometric analysis is contained in Appendix
C.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all individuals displaced during the 1980s.
Column 1 contains statistics for the entire sample, while Columns 2, 3, and 4 describe
those from declining traded, nontraded, and expanding traded industries, separately. The
statistics are based on the restricted sample described in the previous section. For this
sample, the median duration of unemployment was 17 weeks; 78% of the individuals were
reemployed at the time of the survey; 14% had dropped out of the labor force. The average
weekly wages of those displaced was $338 (in constant 1985 dollars), 13 and, of those who
were reemployed, their post-displacement wages decreased by an average of 8.2% between
the date of displacement and the survey.
Turning to a comparison of the different categories of displaced workers, Columns 2
through 4 of Table 1, we find some striking differences. First, workers displaced from traded
,
industries (Columns 2 and 4) are more likely to have been full time workers, less likely to be
female or well educated, and are slightly older; over 17% of traded workers are over the age
of 50, as opposed to just under 13% for nontraded. They are also less likely to have been
reemployed at the survey date. 14 Of the workers who were reemployed, workers separated
froIr.. ~raded industries suffer a significant real reduction in wages, with the greatest loss going
to tn:.Jse displaced from declining traded industries. Those from declining traded industries
13 Note: this includes part time workers.
14 The observations of individuals displaced from declining traded industries were displaced an average of 2.4 years
before the survey date while all others were displaced 2.7 yeal1l prior to their respective survey dates. This
might account for some of the lower probability of reemployment at the survey date, but the large disparity in




All Displaced Workers in the 19805
Declining ExpandingVariable All Traded Nontraded Traded
Demographics
Age 36.2 37.1 35.6 37.9Age> 50 (%) 14.0 16.4 12.8 17.8Married (%) 64.2 68.1 62.6 68.4Black (%) 16.3 15.7 16.0 18.3Female (%) 38.8 34.7 40.5 34.7Education 12.6 12.2 12.7 12.2
Old Job
Tenure 5.2 6.4 4.6 7.2Part Time 10.4 4.6 12.8 4.3
Wages
Old Wages 337.8 366.3 328.1 355.8
-Wage Differential (%) 3.8 9.9 1.5 9.3New Wages 326.9 340.1 323.3 331.0







Wks Unemployed 22.6 28.0 21.8 20.5Censored (%) 24.5 28.7 23.5 24.8Shutdown (%) 48.7 47.1 48.8 49.8Slack Work (%) 37.9 43.0 36.5 39.8Position Abolished (%) 13.4 9.9 14.7 10.4Industry of Disp:
Declining Traded (%) 15.6
Expanding fTraded (%) 13.3
Employment
Re-employed (%) 77.6 74.2 78.9 74.4Unemployed (%) 8.1 11.1 7.0 11.1Not in Labor Force (%) 14.3 14.7 14.1 14.5
N 24,494 3,087 11,761 3,796Weighted N (mill) 50.2 6.5 36.2 7.5
Source: Calculations by the author from the 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990 DWS.A description of the above variables is contained in Appendix B.
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also suffer spells of unemployment that are almost 2 months longer than all other workers,
28 weeks versus 22 weeks. This is consistent with a lower probability of being reemployed
at the survey date.
Table 2 presents the same statistics for a subset of the observations in Table 1. This
subset includes only individuals displaced from full time jobs who remain in the labor force.
This sample corresponds directly to that used in the analysis of unemployment duration in
the next section and excludes those individuals who have dropped out of the labor market.
Table 3, accordingly, presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of observations used
in the post displacement wage equations. This represents a further restriction to those
individuals who were employed, at least part time, at the survey date.
The general observations from Table 1 appear to carry over to Tables 2 and 3; except
for the duration of unemployment. Once those wha have dropped out of the labor force are
excluded, those displaced from expanding traded industries no longer exhibit the shortest
spells of unemployment. In addition, it should be noted that those displaced from declining
traded industries, Column 2 of Table 2, were relatively well paid; weekly wages for this group
were approximately 5% greater than for all other displaced workers. These individuals also
suffered the greatest decline in wages, -17.3%, as opposed to -14% for those from expanding
traded industries and a 9% decrease for those from nontraded industries.
These three tables suggest that the post-displacement experiences of trade displaced
workers do, in fact, differ significantly from other workers. They do not, however, permit one
to conclude that this is not simply due to observable characteristics. For this, one must turn
to multivariate regression techniques; such is the focus of the following sections. Consistent
with the human capital story of Section 2, workers from declining traded industries suffer
more than both those from nontraded industries and expanding traded industries. The
implication of the theory was that those displaced from expanding La.ded industries should
suffer the least hinges on the relative growth rates of the two categories. If the nontraded





Still in the Labor Force
Declining ExpandingVariable All Traded Nontraded Traded
Demographics
Age 33.3 33.8 32.8 34.9Age> 50 9.1 9.5 8.3 11.7Married (%) 65.2 69.3 63.0 69.6Black (%) 14.9 15.1 14.3 17.0Female (%) 31.5 29.0 32.7 29.2Education 12.7 12.4 12.9 12.3
Old Job
Tenure 4.8 5.8 4.1 6.7
Wages
Old Wages 375.7 387.1 371.7 378.0






Wks Unemployed 19.2 25.8 17.2 19.5Censored (%) 20.1 27.1 18.1 20.0Shutdown (%) 48.4 46.3 48.8 49.2Slack Work (%) 38.1 43.7 35.9 40.3Position Abolished (%) 13.5 10.0 15.3 10.5Industry of Disp:
Declining Traded (%) 18.9
Expanding ;Traded (%) 15.8
Employment
Re-employed (%) 82.5 77.0 84.1 82.2Unemployed 17.5 23.0 15.9 17.8
N 15,402 2,887 10,225 2,290Weighted N (mill) 25.4 4.8 16.6 4.8






Variable All Traded Nontraded Traded
Demographics
Age 33.1 33.6 32.6 34.6
Age> 50 8.2 9.0 7.5 10.5
Married (%) 66.3 70.6 64.2 70.7
Black (%) 13.4 12.8 13.0 15.8
Female (%) 32.1 27.8 33.9 29.3
Education 12.9 12.6 13.1 12.5
Old Job
Tenure 4.8 5.8 4.1 6.8
Wages
Old Wages 382.8 401.5 376.9 386.6
-Wage Differential (%) 4.5 10.7 1.6 9.7
New Wages 344.6 347.8 345.1 338.8
-Wage Differential (%) 1.3 3.2 0.3 3.6
Ll(Wage) (%) -11.1 -17.3 -8.7 -13.9
Displacement
Wks Unemployed 17.3 23.3 15.5 18.2
Censored (%) 3.1 5.4 2.6 2.7
Shutdown (%) 50.8 49.0 51.1 51.7
Slack Work (%) 35.2 40.5 33.2 37.2
Position Abolished (%) 14.0 10.4 15.7 11.1
Industry of Disp:
Declining Traded (%) 17.7
Expanding Traded (%) 15.8
N 12,662 2,221 8,557 1,884
Weighted N (mill) 21.0 3.7 14.5 3.3
Source: Calculations by the author from the 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990 DWS.
A description of the above variables is contained in Appendix B.
explain the larger decline in wages for those from expanding traded industries.15
6. Econometric Methodology
The econometric analysis of this study is focused on the differences in the postdis-
placement experience of workers separated from expanding traded industries, contracting
traded industries, and nontraded industries. This sections contains a detailed presentation
of the methodology used to measure the effects of trade displacement on unemployment
duration and reemployment wages. In what follows, the construction of the trade related
variables is discussed, followed in separate subsections by the unemployment and wage change
methodology.
In Haveman (1992), it was determined for each of 29 traded industries whether
changes in trade patterns had increased or decreased the number of workers displaced in
each year from 1981-1989. These results are utilized to associate each displaced worker into
one of the three categories listed above. Individuals displaced from an industry identified
as suffering increased displacements are categorized as displaced from a declining traded
industry. Those displaced from industries with fewer displacements are from expanding
traded industries. The import and export price data are missing for some traded industries
other than the 29 mentioned above, both for some industries in all years and for only the early
1980s for other,industries. All individuals displaced from these industries and in those years
are excluded. In addition, observations of individuals displaced from nontraded industries
are also included.
In each section of analysis, two dummy variables will be included: TRDDEC and
TRDEXP, where
TRDDEC = {I, if displaced from a declining traded industry,0, otherwise.
and
TRDEXP = {I, if displaced from an expanding traded industry,0, otherwise.
15 Evidence from Carey and Franklin (1991) suggests this to be the case.
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The remainder of this section discusses the use of these variables in determining the effect
of the type of industry of displacement on postdisplacement labor market experiences.
6.1 Unemployment
The equation used in the empirical analysis of unemployment duration takes the
form:
U = g{xi.B + f(Traden (1)
where U is the duration of the unemployment spell, which depends on the linear function in
brackets; X is a vector of individual-specific control variables, and f(·) is a function of trade
competition. In the analysis of unemployment duration, f(-) will take one of two forms;
either
f(·) = "nTRDDEC +,2T RDEXP
or
f(·) = ,0DDISPL,
where DDISP L is the number of displaced workers attributable to trade from the same
industry in the same year as the particular observation. 16 DDISP L is continuous and pos-
itive for declining traded industries and negative for expanding industries. The larger is
DDISP L, the/larger is the pool of displaced workers with skills comparable to the displaced
individual. This results in more intense competition for jobs most appropriate for the in-
dividual and consequently a longer spell of unemployment; ,0 is therefore expected to be
positive. It is expected that ,1 will be positive and significantly greater than ,2' The sign
of ,2 depends on the relative rates of growth in expanding traded and nontraded industries,
as discussed in the previous section, and is hence indeterminate.
In the absence of censoring, equation (1) could be estimated using ordinary least
squares techr:'":"les. The unemployment data contained in the DWS are, however, subject to
16 See Appei: A..
censoring from two sources. First, some individuals are in the middle of their jobless spell at
the time of the survey, and second, the unemployment duration variable is topcoded at 99
weeks. This means that the actual period of joblessness, should it be incomplete or exceed
99 weeks, is unobservable. The presence of censoring requires the use of duration analysis.
Equation (1), or more generally, the relationship between the Xs (inclusive of the
trade variables), and U, the duration of unemployment, will be examined in the context of an
accelerated failure-time model.17 More specifically, a Weibull model of duration dependence
is employed.18 The Weibull model is a single parameter proportional hazard model, with a
hazard function, or conditional exit rate, of the following form: 19
()(x, t) = Pr(U = tlU > t - 1) = Aada - 1 ,
where U is the length of the unemployment spell, t is the current week, A = e-/3'X, and a
and (3 are the parameters to be estimated. In this framework, a measures the degree of time
dependence of the hazard rate. If a = 1, the hazard rate is time invariant; a > 1 implies
a monotonically increasing hazard rate while a < 1 implies a decreasing hazard rate. A
decreasing (increasing) hazard rate means that the probability of escaping unemployment in
the next period declines (increases) over time. A value of a less than one could be the result
of either true duration dependence, or because of unobserved heterogeneity.20
The (3 parameters, in conjunction with a, measure the proportional change in the ex-




Because of the skewed nature of the distribution of unemployment durations, it is more
appropriate to look at the effects on the expected median weeks of joblessness, which is
17 Lancaster (1990), pg. 40.
18 Other specifications such as the exponential and gamma distributions were estimated with little significant
difference in the results.
19 Lancaster (1990), pg. 44.




for the Weibull distribution; where A = e-f3'x. The expected median weeks joblessness,
E[MU], is calculated using a, ~, and the mean of the regressor variables. In order to calculate
the effects of dummy variables, E[MU] is calculated first with the dummy equal to zero, and
then equal to 1. The difference is then the addition to the median weeks joblessness of the
characteristic represented by the dummy variable.21
One consequence of this choice of model is the proportional hazard restriction. This
restriction imposes the constraint that the hazard rates of two observations with different
regressor vectors Xl and X2 will be in the same proportion ()(xI)/()(X2), for all t. The
implication is that the importance of a particular characteristic in determining the duration
of unemployment is not permitted to change with time. This might be inappropriate for
several of the explanatory variables; for instance, high tenure on the previous job may reflect
a lack of knowledge of labor markets. This would imply inefficient search during the first
part of the unemployment spell that was not present for somebody with more recent job
search experience. The effect of an initial inefficient search would be a lower hazard or exit
rate in the first few weeks of joblessness for individuals with long predisplacement tenure.
Presumably, with the passage of time, the search would become more efficient and the
importance of tenure in determining the exit rate would diminish.
The potential for this problem also exists with respect to the predisplacement wage.
An individual displaced from a high wage industry might set an initial reservation wage
inappropriately high. With the passage of time, this reservation wage would presumably be
adjusted to a more appropriate level. Interpretation of the coefficients on these variables is
thus subject to this qualification.
21 See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) or Lancaster (1990) for additional information on the Weibull distribution.
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Econometric Technique
As discussed above, what is observed in the displaced worker survey is not U, the
actual duration of joblessness, but U*, where
U* _ { U, if the individual is employed
- P + 1, if U ~ P
where P is the potential observable unemployment duration, i. e., the minimum of 99 or the
number of weeks between displacement and the time of the survey.
The data on unemployment therefore suffer from "right censorship" of two types.
First, the unemployment duration variable is topcoded at 99, so the observed duration for
individuals unemployed for more than 99 weeks will be truncated. Second, only information
on the incomplete unemployment spell is available for individuals still active in the labor
market, yet unemployed, at the survey date. To account for this censorship, a maximum
likelihood estimation technique for the Weibull distribution is employed. The technique is
conceptually analogous to that for Tobit analysis of normal distributions with truncated
observations.
IfU is observed for an individual, her contribution to the likelihood function is simply
the probability density function of completed duration,
feU) = aUa- 1exp{-[3'x - Uaexp(-[3'x)}.
If P < U, then' her contribution is f(Ui*):
Prob(U/ ~ Pi + 1) = J00 f(y)dy
Pi+l
= exp{ - Ui*a exp( -[3'Xi)}
The likelihood function for the entire population is then
"1
L =II aU/a- 1exp{ - [3'Xi - utaexp( - [3' Xi)}
"2
X IT exp{- Ui*a exp(-[3'Xi)},
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where nl denotes the sample of noncensored observations, and n2 denotes the right censored
observations.22
The choice of control variables is guided by the relevant parts of the theoretical search
literature. In addition, TENURE, the time spent at the predisplacement job, is included
to reflect the amount of industry-specific human capital the individual has developed. It
is also possible that TENURE reflects the expectations of recall by the individual. The
reasoning is that, ceteris paribus, an individual with more experience in a given industry will
be the more desirable worker. The expected sign on TENURE is therefore positive, as the
expectation of recall rises, search effort declines, and hence the duration of unemployment
also rises, or equivalently, the escape rate from unemployment falls. 23
6.2 Changes in Wages
The second point of analysis concerns the determination of the postdisplacement
wages. In seeking to determine the differential effects of the source of displacement on
earnings, the focus will be on the following model of the change in earnings experienced by
displaced workers
lnWi,i - lnWi-l,i = h(Xjf3) + foi' (2)
where Wi,i is tlle individual's current weekly earnings, Wi-I,i is the weekly predisplacement
wage and Xi is a vector of individual-specific heterogeneity, to be discussed below. The
predisplacement wage, Wi-l,i, is inflated to match the year of the current earnings. The
inflator is calculated for 2-digit census industries from annual March CPS computer tapes
and is defined simply as the annual rate of aggregate wage· growth of each industry. It is
thus assumed that the individuals wages would have grown at the same rate as that of the
average worker in the industry. The difference in wages is then the current wage less the
22 Solon (1985) employs this methodology to assess the impact of the receipt of unemployment insurance on
unemployment duration.
23 Other studies that utilize the DWS to estimate jobless duration models are KI11Be (1988) and Podgursky and
Swaim (1987& and 1987b).
expectation of wages in the undisplaced state.24
Although the equation of primary interest is the change in wages, it should be rec-
ognized that this is a particular restriction of a more general model which explains the
postdisplacement wages:
lnUJ;o ° = X'/3 + ""'lnUJ;o_l . + U 0 °
',1 /',1 ',1
where Ui,j can be decomposed into two parts:
Ui,j = Aj + TJi,j.
(3)
Aj is the unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity component, and TJi,j is a serially un-
correlated normally distributed error component.
The equation in (2) is the following first differenced version of equation (3):
lnWi,j - lnU'i-l,j = (Xi - Xi-d'/3 + ,(lnWi-l,j - lnU'i-2,j) + Vi,j,
where
Vi,j = TJi,j - TJi-l,j
and is distributed normally. Due to data limitations, the restriction that , = 0 is imposed,
i. e., that the wage effects of the previous displacement are unimportant. The extent to which
this correction is appropriate depends on the time between involuntary displacements. A
lower bound on the length of time is simply the tenure on the predisplacement job; the
undifferenced tenure variables are therefore included in the differenced regressor matrix.
The coefficient on the tenure variable will also include the effects of other elements related
to involuntary displacement; such as inefficient initial job search. It will, consequently, be
impossible to attach concrete meaning to the coefficient on the tenure variable.
Not only is this the most desirable specification for analysing the differential effects
of the industry of displacement, but it also controls for Aj, the unobserved individual-
specific heterogeneity. Also presented in the analysis are the unrestricted postdisplacement
24 There are problems with this approach associated with the fact that we cannot pin down the time of displacement
within the year reported. This and other problems are dillCUSSed in Valletta (1991).
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equations and the converse restriction that the predisplacement wages are unimportant for
explaining postdisplacement wages.25 A full complement of X variables is included in the
first differenced version of the equation to account for changes in wages that are related to
observable characteristics of the individual.
The method of estimation is designed to take into account two sources of bias in-
herent in a single OL5 estimation of the {3's in equation (2). The first source of bias is the
selection criterion employed in determining the sample. The sample includes only those em-
ployed, at least part time, at the survey date. If there is any systematic difference between
those employed and those remaining unemployed, the estimated coefficients will be biased
and inconsistent. The conventional two-step selectivity adjustment procedure suggested by
Heckman (1979) is therefore implemented.
The second source of bias arises from the endogeneity of the duration of unemploy-
ment in the postdisplacement wage equation. Both unemployment duration and postdis-
placement wages are determined by the distribution of wage offers received. To the extent
that this distribution is not perfectly explained by the included regressor matrix, the du-
ration of unemployment will be correlated with the error term. The correction employed
involves calculating the predicted spell of unemployment from the analysis of the previous
section. The predicted duration variable is then used as a regressor in the postdisplacement
equation (Lee J981). This approach conforms to the instrumental variables technique and
i
appropriately corrects for the endogeneity bias.
In addition to the fairly standard set of regressors, dummy variables representing the
length of time between displacement and the survey date are included. When combined with
the duration of unemployment, these dummy variables proxy for the length of tenure on the
current job. The coefficients on the PRE-variables are therefore expected to be positive and
increasing with the time between displacement and survey, i.e., PREi > PREj, IrJ i > j.
The state unemployment rate for experienced workers in the year of displacement
as well as the trend in state unemployment are included as a measure of the economic
25 The estimated coefficients from the predisplacement wage equation are presented in Appendix D.
conditions surrounding the search ,for employment.26 The actual unemployment rate should
enter negatively, reflecting a larger pool of applicants for each job opening. The trend should
also enter with a negative coefficient; a positive trend indicates a deteriorating economic
climate in which to conduct a job search. The inclusion of these variables also serves to
control for the "unemployment congestion" hypothesis which explains some of the observed
change in wages.
7. Results
This section presents the results of the econometric analysis of trade displaced work-
ers. First is a discussion of unemployment duration, followed by an examination of the
changes in wages experienced by trade displaced workers.
7.1 Unemployment Duration
Referring back to Table 1, recall that individuals displaced from traded industries
appear to be susceptible to longer spells of unemployment than do workers from nontraded
industries. Given that workers from traded industries appear to be somewhat older, less
educated, more likely to be married and to have longer tenure on the predisplacement job,
it is not clear ,whether this observation is because of observable worker heterogeneity or
i
perhaps because of industry-specific effects on individuals, such as the endowment of less
valued industry-specific human capital. The analysis of this section will shed some light on
the actual source of the difference in unemployment duration. This section proceeds with a
discussion of further data restrictions followed by a discussion of the regression results.




The subset of the DWS used for the analysis of unemployment includes all workers
over the age of 17 at the time of displacement and currently less than 65 years of age. The
lower bound is imposed as it is assumed that individuals in the labor market aged 18 and
above are more reflective of permanent lifetime participants in the labor market, while the
upper bound merely omits those expected to be retired. The sample is further restricted to
include only those displaced from full time positions and those that reported weekly earnings
in excess of $80/week. An individual must also be an active labor market participant in order
to be included.27
In addition, the trade price dataset used to calculate the changes in industry dis-
placements is incomplete. There are some traded industries that are not covered by the data,
and the trade prices are not available for other industries before 1984. In order to reduce the
contamination of the results, by including possibly trade displaced workers with nontraded
workers, all workers displaced from traded industries, or in time periods, for which trade
price data do not exist, are omitted.
Results
Table 4 contains the coefficients on the trade variables from various specifications
of the unemployment durz ~n model of equation 1. Appendix E contains the entire set
of coefficients. Specification 1, which excludes the trade variables, has been estimated in a
number of other publications.28 It is included in Table 4 only to facilitate a comparison of the
differences in a and the log of the likelihood function. The coefficients are comparable to
those found elsewhere, but in general are more precisely estimated because of the relatively
27 This excludes individuals reporting employment status as: keeping house, going to school, unable to work,
retired or other. These individuals are excluded because it is believed that they might exhibit artificially long
unemployment spells. A more thorough analysis might include a 2~tage model where the first stage models
the decision to drop out of the labor force. One would not expect the results for the trade variables to be
qualitatively different because of this omission.
28 See, for example, Kruse (1988), Podgursky and Swaim (1987a) and Solon (1985).
large size of this dataset.29
Column 2 presents the results from the specification including the two traded dummy
variables: TRDDEC and TRDEXP. TRDDEC is 1 for individuals displaced from a declin-
ing traded industry, an industry in a year in which trade competition is particularly severe.
Conversely, TRDEXP is 1 for individuals displaced from an expanding traded industry. The
results are quite consistent with the univariate observations from Ta1?le 2. The positive sign
on both traded coefficients indicates that individuals separated from traded industries expe-
rience substantially longer spells of unemployment than do those displaced from nontraded
industries. As expected, displacement from declining traded industries results in unemploy-
ment spells significantly longer than those from expanding trading industries, consistent with
the conjectured nontransferability of human capital by trade displaced workers. The coeffi-
cients on TRDDEC and TRDEXP are significantly different from each other in Specification.
2 at any conventional level.
Recall from section 5 the interpretation of coefficients in Table 4. The ratio of {3 to a,
in this framework, is the proportional change in the explanatory variable. From Regression
2 then, we find that displacement from a declining traded industry leads to a 36% increase in
the expected duration of unemployment. Similarly, displacement from an expanding traded
industry results in a spell of unemployment that is 21%longer than that exhibited by workers
displaced from.nontraded industries.
I
Regression 3 allows for a perhaps more significant test of the human capital sub-
stitutability hypothesis. Here, the two traded variables and the tenure variable have been
replaced by three cross terms; TENURE * a dummy variable for each of the three types
of individuals. Using tenure on the predisplacement job as a proxy for the amount of
firm/industry specific human capital the individual has developed, these three variables
will highlight the differences in human capital depletion among workers displaced from the
three industries.
29 One exception is the coefficient on the female dummy. Here, the coefficient is small and insignificant, suggesting
that the unemployment experiences are similar for men and women. This result does not hold when individuals




(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5
TRDDEC .289*·· .217*·· .196*··
(0.044) (0.055) (0.056)




TRDDEC * Tenure .029*·· .019*·· .019***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
TRDEXP * Tenure .011** .004 .004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)




a .791 .792 .792 .792 .793
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)




A complete set of regression results is available from the author.
1Unless otherwise indicated, the coefficients are all significant at the 99% level.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
.** Significant at the 99% level.
While the results from Regression 2 did indeed suggest a different experience for
those in declining and expanding trade industries, the cross product terms with tenure
suggest a larger difference still. This increases the support for comparative advantage story.
Displacement from a declining traded industry will result in a 4% increase in the duration
of unemployment for every year of tenure, while displacement from an expanding traded
industry will result in only a 1.4% longer spell for each year of displacement. This suggests
that human capital loss is more important for traded industries generally, but is almost three
times more important for those displaced from declining traded industries.
Regression 3, vis a vis Regression 4, imposes the restriction that TRDDEC and
TRDEXP are independently unimportant. From Regression 4, however, we see that there
are factors inherent in displacement from a traded industry, expanding or contracting, that
result in a substantially longer spell of unemployment. This result can, again, be explained
in terms of the relative growth rates for traded versus nontraded industries, and the greater
depreciation of human capital that comes from crossing this line.
It is often argued that import competition is most likely to occur in industries that
pay relatively high wages. IT wages are high, this could be an indication of excess rents in
the industry. Imports are attracted by these rents, resulting in displacements. In an effort to
obtain a position which also pays such rents, the individual may set their reservation wage
inappropriately high, a higher reservation wage will result in a longer spell of unemployment.
To control for this explanation, Specification 4 includes the 3-digit interindustry wage differ-
entials reported in Krueger and Summers (1987). The interindustry wage differential is the
premium workers receive for being employed in a particular industry. That is, the percentage
difference between the wages received in an industry and the average wage of all workers
with similar observable characteristics.
The descriptive statistics of Table 2 suggest that workers displaced from traded
industries are from industries that pay a large wage premium, Column 5 of Table 4 suggests
that there is a significant correlation between predisplacement wage premiums and the spell
of unemployment. The inclusion of the wage differential does not, however, significantly
impact the coefficients on the traded industry variables. Each of the trade-related coefficients
is smaller, but only marginally so. We can therefore rule out the argument that it is the wage
premiums that are driving the duration of unemployment rather than the traded variables.
The results of this section do suggest that, even controlling for a wide variety of
elements, individuals displaced from declining traded industries do tend to suffer from ab-
normally long spells of unemployment.
7.2 Postdisplacement Wages
Data
The sample of observations is a subset of those used for the analysis of unemployment
duration. The subset is chosen based on the current employment status of the individual. If
the individual is currently employed, at least part time, then she is included in the analysis.
Note that this excludes not only individuals that have not worked since displacement, but
also individuals that have worked since displacement, but have for one reason or another left
that job as well. This sample includes all observations for which reasonable current wages
are available.3O
Results
Table 5 contains the results from the post-displacement wage regression analysis.
Recall the two statistical corrections; first, the Heckman two-step correction for selection
bias, and second, the unemployment duration variable is the predicted value from the pre-
ferred specification in the previous section. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients
reported are consistent with the results from previous studies. The coefficient on unemploy-
ment duration is negative and significant for all specifications. As in Addison and Protugal
30 Reasonable is defined by approximately S2/hour. This meaDB a minimum. wage of $40/week forparttime workers
and 580/week for full time workers in constant 1985 dollars.
Table 5
Postdisplacement Wage Equations




























A complete set of regression results is available from the author.~p is the predicted weeks ofunemployment(+l) from Regression 4 in Table 4.A is the Invene Mills Ratio.
*Significant at the 95% level.
-*Significant at the 99% level.
(1988), there appears to be a negative selection, i.e., the employed individuals are earning
less than wouIa be expected from their unemployed counterparts, or in Regression 3, the
currently employed took larger pay cuts than we would expect to observe for the currently
unemployed.
Of primary interest are the trade related variables. Consistent with the descriptive
statistics, Specification 1 suggests that, when you do not control for predisplacement wages,
individuals displaced from declining traded industries have higher post-displacement earn-
ings than do all others. The coefficient is, however, statistically insignificant. Of secondary
importance, the coefficient on the tenure variable is negative in Regression 2 and 3. This
implies, as discussed in section 5, that the effects of inefficient search outweigh the effects of
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the wage loss due to a previous displacement.
More in keeping with prior expectations, the inclusion of the predisplacement wages
reveals that the postdisplacement wage is lower for trade displaced workers than for all other
workers; the coefficient, however, remains insignificant. Furthermore, the change in wages
for individuals from declining traded industries is negative and significantly greater than
for other displaced individuals. This is largely consistent with a more extreme depletion of
industry-specific human capital for trade displaced workers than for others.
Not consistent with the human capital substitutability is that TRDEXP and TRD-
DEC enter with coefficients of the same sign. While the relative magnitudes are as expected,
the original hypothesis was that the respective coefficients would be of opposite sign. This
result, as was a comparable relationship with respect to unemployment duration, can be
attributed to a higher rate of general growth for nontraded industries relative to that of
expanding traded industries.
Greater reliance is to be placed on the results of the wage-difference specification,
equation (2), because of its ability to control for unobservable individual-specific hetero-
geneity. Note also that the methodology used in Haveman (1992) is not particularly strong
when it comes to identifying expanding traded industries. A methodology that was better
able to identify an expansion of exports might produce the anticipated sign on TRDEXP.
Therefore, the :comparative advantage story cannot be ruled out.
8. Decomposition of Expected Unemployment Spells
As discussed in Section 3, there have been several studies examining the types of
workers displaced by trade, only one of which makes use of the DWS. Common to most
of these studies is the finding that individuals displaced by trade have a more difficult
postdisplacement experience than do other displaced workers. The explanation for this
result is generally that these individuals possess characteristics, independent of the industry
of displacement, that result in longer than normal spells of unemployment. This section will
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Decomposition of Unemployment Duration

















utilize the results of Section 7.1 to assess the extent to which this conclusion applies to the
current dataset.
In what follows, a decomposition of the expected spell of unemployment for workers
displaced from declining traded industries, from expanding traded industries, and from non-
traded industries is presented. The regression coefficients from Specification 2 of Table 4 are
used to separate the contribution of individual-specific characteristics from the contribution
of the industry of displacement, expanding or declining traded, to the expected number of
weeks of unemployment. This is followed by an accounting of the expected number of weeks
of unemployed resources caused by changes in trade throughout the 1980s.
Table 6 presents a decomposition of the expected unemployment duration into two
sources. The first source, individual-specific characteristics, is the number of weeks we would
expect the individual to be unemployed, in the absence of specific industry of displacement
effects. The second source is the expected addition to the spell of unemployment by the
category of the industry of displacement.
The total expected unemployment duration is the mean of the predicted values from
Specification 2 of Table 4. The value expressed here is the expected number of weeks absent
any censoring and is hence significantly greater than the mean number of weeks expressed
in Table 2. The expected duration for declining traded industries is approximately 12 weeks
more than the censored mean. It is plausible that the censoring mechanism reduces the mean
so dramatically given that a quarter of the observations are censored. The number of weeks
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unemployed due to individual-specific characteristics is calculated as the predicted values
absent the effects of the traded industry dummy variables. The effect of the type of industry
is then the difference between the values for total and individual-specific characteristics.
Row 1 of Table 6 confirms the results of previous studies. The demographic charac-
teristics of workers displaced by trade do result in abnormally long spells of unemployment,
eight weeks longer than for those displaced from expanding traded industries and six weeks
longer than those from nontraded industries. The result that the characteristics of those
displaced from expanding traded industries are the least likely to result in prolonged spells
of unemployment is entirely consistent with the human capital story told in the introduction.
Individuals of the type demanded by expanding traded industries are in the highest relative
demand.
In addition to the effects of individual-specific characteristics, however, being dis-
placed from a declining traded industry is responsible for an additional nine and a half
weeks of unemployment for these workers over and above that experienced by those from
nontraded industries. This is four weeks longer than for those displaced from expanding
traded industries. The particular type of industry-specific human capital possessed by the
workers is therefore responsible for an additional month of joblessness. That individuals
displaced from traded industries generally suffer more than those from nontraded industries
is due to the relatively rapid growth of the services sector and the greater substitutability
of the human capital within this sector than between traded and nontraded industries more
generally.
Table 7 presents an accounting of the aggregate number of weeks of unemployment
directly attributable to changes in the competitive position of the United States. The first
column presents the increase in the number of weeks of unemployment due to increased
displacements from declining traded industries while the second column presents the reduc-
tion due to the increased competitive position of, and hence reduced displacements from,
expanding traded industries.
Table 7
An Accounting of the Changes in the Number
of Weeks of Unemployment Caused.
by International Trade in the 1980s




















The values are generated by predicting, again from Specification 2 of Table 4, the
expected duration of unemployment for a.ll of the displaced workers in each industry in each
year, 1981 through 1989. The average of these values is then multiplied by the change in
the number of displacements resulting from trade in that industry and year. If the industry
experienced a greater number of displacements this value is accumulated in the Declining
Traded column. Similarly, reductions are accumulated in the Expanding Traded column.
The net effect of changing trade patterns is then presented in Column 3.
As is evident from the table, the reduction of displacements due to increased competi-
tiveness in some industries fails to offset the increase in the number of weeks of unemployment
attributable to the decline of other traded industries. Although the net impact of trade was
to reduce the number of displacements by 2,901, the difference in expected length of jobless-
ness results in a net increase in the number of weeks of unemployed resources by nearly four
million weeks. The bulk of this is due to the characteristics of those displaced from declining
traded industries. Individual-specific characteristics account for nearly three-fourths of the
additional weeks of unemployment, while industry-specific effects account for the remaining
on~fourth of the increase; a net increase of over one million weeks of unemployment.
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9. Conclusion and Implications for Policy
This study provides an investigation into the differences in the postdisplacement
labor market experiences of workers separated from declining traded, expanding traded and
nontraded industries. The results presented provide the beginnings of a bridge across the
gap between what is known and·what is perceived regarding the allocative efficiency effects
of trade-related labor displacements.
The strategy of the paper is to relate the postdisplacement experience of individ-
uals to changes in the competitive position of the industry from which the individual was
displaced. The investigative lens is primarily focused on the impact of changing industry
competitiveness on the duration of unemployment spells and the change in wages accompa-
nying displacement.
The results of the previous sections provide evidence that workers in declining traded
industries experience greater hardship when displaced. It was shown that the duration of
unemployment spells was longer for those individuals, the probability of reemployment was
lower, and that once reemployed, these individuals experience a larger decline in wages than
do other displaced workers.
It has been suggested elsewhere that this was merely a result of the characteristics
of the displaced workers, i.e., trade displaced workers are more likely to be female, black,
and less skilleq..31 If this assertion is correct, then the argument for specific relief of trade
displaced workers, e.g., TAA, is diminished. This assertion is, however, inconsistent with
the results presented above. Both the results for unemployment duration and changes in
wages suggest that trade displaced workers suffer to a greater degree because they are: trade
displaced. The simple explanation put forth in the introduction, that trade displaced workers
are endowed with a large proportion of particularly useless industry-specific human capital
is quite consistent with this result.
The implication is therefore that if assistance to displaced workers is to be most
productive, i. e., directed towards those most in need, targeting trade displaced workers
31 See Tyson et aI. (1988), pg. 80.
would seem to be appropriate. Indeed, the results suggest beneficial effects of trade-related
assistance based on both distributional equity and allocative efficiency grounds. The evidence
presented reveals a loss of income to those displaced because of trade which exceeds the
income gains to those remaining employed because of an increased competitive position
of their industry. Combined with the benefits to consumers of freer trade, distributional
considerations suggest some assistance in the form of income maintenance is warranted.
The accounting undertaken in Section 8 goes further to present an argument based
on allocative efficiency for assistance. The findings presented reveal that even when the
increased employment in expanding traded industries is considered, there is a considerable
increase in the quantity of unemployed resources resulting from the adjustment to changes
in international competitiveness. It would seem that job retraining or job search assistance
would also be a reasonable response to combat the allocative efficiency effects, J.e., unem-
ployment of resources resulting from changes in international competition.
In addition to the evidence in favor of trade-related assistance, the results presented
here provide support for using this methodology, or some refined version of it to identify,
ex ante, trade impacted workers. It would seem that the use of such a methodology would
improve on the petition and response system currently in place. While this methodology can
be implemented only with significant lags, the current system does not provide especially
timely response to petitions. The results of this study also provide evidence that a program
based on this methodology would, on average, provide assistance to those in greatest need.
· ~-
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APPENDIX A




Breakdown of Displacements by Year
for 1981 through 1989
Displacements
Change due to:
Year Actual. X+M Export Price Import Price
1981 378933 62572 -1531 64102
1982 574594 30770 -377 31147
1983 689962 11014 28 10986
1984 540342 4987 -1071 6058
1985 712690 5505 -1581 7086
Sub-Total 2896521 114848 -4532 119379
1986 447284 -60573 -846 -59727
1987 430524 -51955 988 -52944
1988 335283 -16449 -1050 -15399
1989 419601 11140 -1138 12278
Sub-Total 1632692 -117837 -2046 -115792
Total 4529213 -2991 -6578 3587
